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Análise da escolha das estruturas de governança em vinícolas 
brasileiras – estudos de casos em 3 vinícolas
A decisão da melhor estrutura de governança adotada pelas empresas tem sido 
objeto de estudo de diversas vertentes teóricas, muitas vezes, dissociadas. 
Assim, este estudo pretende contribuir para a compreensão dos múltiplos 
fatores que influenciam nas decisões de governança da empresa, a partir dos 
argumentos da Economia dos Custos de Transação; da Visão Baseada em 
Recursos e da Teoria dos Direitos de Propriedade. Para identificar alguns 
desses fatores, foram analisados  três casos na indústria do vinho brasileiro: 
Miolo, localizada no Vale dos Vinhedos (Sul do Brasil) e no Vale do Rio 
São Francisco (Nordeste do Brasil); Don Laurindo, localizada no Vale dos 
Vinhedos; e a Vinibrasil, localizada no Vale do Rio São Francisco. A maioria 
das vinícolas estudadas produz as uvas utilizadas na produção de vinho. Apenas 
a Miolo compra uma quantidade insignificante de uvas fora de sua produção. 
É importante observar que no Brasil, a produção de uva nestas regiões tem 
uma longa tradição e não é difícil comprar uma quantidade suficiente de uvas 
destinadas à produção de vinho. Identificou-se que a qualidade das uvas é 
fácil de ser medida e o custo de compra no mercado é mais barato do que a 
produção própria. Porém, as vinícolas argumentam que produzem a própria uva 
para garantir a qualidade das uvas e, consequentemente, do vinho produzido. 
Entretanto, o nível de especificidade dos ativos presentes na transação entre 
produtor de uva e vinícola parece, por si só, insuficiente para justificar o uso 
de forma de governança hierárquica. Assim, o objetivo do artigo é analisar 
as razões pelas quais essas vinícolas, em grande parte, dependem da forma 
de governança hierárquica para adquirir suas uvas. O que explica o uso de 
governança hierárquica, uma vez que tanto a especificidade de ativos como 
os problemas de mensuração parecem relativamente baixos?
Palavras-chave: vinícolas brasileiras, governança hierárquica, economia dos custos 
 de transação, visão baseada em recursos, direitos de propriedade.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The Portuguese introduced viticulture in Brazil in the early 
of 16th century and production was restricted to the south and 
southeast up to 1960s, after which the cultivation of grape was 
brought to semiarid region of the Vale do Rio São Francisco, 
the viticulture in tropical Brazil (Instituto Brasileiro do Vinho 
[IBRAVIN], 2013a). In the mid-1970s with the entry of 
multinational companies that have introduced innovations in 
production and logistics sector, this activity has emerged in the 
country (Schmidt, 2012). From the 80s, according to Protas 
(2008), the industry engaged in political action to promote 
improvements in the structure of national winemaking through 
intensive investments in the modernization of the wineries. 
The motivation of the business was due to the possibility of 
domestic market growth, both for traditional products such as 
the international standard (fine wines), which have potential 
for commercialization with greater added value. In short, the 
wineries have sought strategies to expand their market.
Currently, the Brazilian viticulture covers an area of 81 
thousands hectares with vineyards from the far south to regions 
near the equator. Two regions stand out: Vale dos Vinhedos 
in the South of Brazil, producing an average of 777 million 
kilos of grape per year, and Vale do Rio São Francisco in the 
Brazilian Northeastern (IBRAVIN, 2013b). With regard to the 
Vale do Rio São Francisco, currently, it is estimated that there 
is an area of vineyards with varieties geared to producing wines 
that give rise to approximately 7 million liters of wine / year, 
80% red wine and 20% white (IBRAVIN, 2013a).
The wineries are concerned about the quality of grapes; 
it is an important issue to produce wine with good quality. 
This is the main incentive to wineries cultivate their own 
grapes in order to control and monitor all phases of their wine 
production. However, the general argument applied to the 
hierarchy governance is broader than just transaction cost. 
Resource attributes that include skills/knowledge or resource 
based view and property rights theory is well connected to the 
former theories. 
This study aims to contribute understanding the multiple 
factors that influence firm’s governance decisions. To identify 
some of those factors, we analyzed three cases in the Brazilian 
wine industry as an example. The Brazilian wine industry is an 
interesting context for the purpose of this study because there 
is already viticulture consolidated in Rio Grande do Sul, where 
Vale dos Vinhedos is located, and in Vale do Rio São Francisco 
located in the Brazilian Northeastern. Although the purchase 
of grapes in market is feasible, some wineries have attempted 
to produce grapes in-house. 
The three wineries selected for this study are located in 
Vale dos Vinhedos and in Vale do Rio São Francisco, where 
production of grapes is well developed. Although plural forms 
were observed (Koenig, Sousa, Watanabe & Wever, 2014), they 
are mainly organized into hierarchy governance form, what 
seem contradictory since it is not difficult purchase grapes in 
the market. One of the reasons for choosing the hierarchy form 
is that the wineries are concerned about the quality of grapes, 
because it is an important issue to produce wine with good 
quality. On the other hand the quality of grapes is measurable 
and the cost to buy grapes in the market is less expensive 
than producing it in-house. Therefore, asset specificity and 
measurement problems seem to be not the only characteristics 
that explain the hierarchy governance choice. The question 
that then arises is: What explains the hierarchy governance, 
besides the asset specificity and measurement problems? In 
other words, the general argument applied to the hierarchy 
governance, besides transaction cost economics, also requires 
a resource based view and property rights-based explanation, 
both which are well connected to transaction cost economics. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the 
next section, the three theories – transaction cost, property 
rights, and resource-based view – are briefly described. 
Subsequently, we discuss the methodology used in the study. 
In the fourth section, the cases – Miolo, Don Laurindo, and 
ViniBrasil – are described and analyzed using the theories 
discussed. In the fifth and final section, concluding remarks 
are presented.
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
In this section we argue that each of the three theories 
– Transaction Cost Economics; Resource Based View; 
Property Rights – gives an incomplete picture of the factors 
affecting firms’ governance decisions when taking in isolation. 
Some authors’ contributions concerned the comparison, 
complementarity or possible integration between the theories. 
Particularly, with regard to transaction costs, there are studies 
that explore the possibilities of integration with capabilities/
resources (Williamson, 1999; Jacobides & Winter, 2005; 
Argyres & Bigelow, 2008; Argyres & Zenger, 2012). As we will 
explain below, in some situations each of the three theories will 
predict a different governance decision, while in other situations 
the theories will predict the same governance decision, but 
for different reasons. Jointly considering all three theoretical 
perspectives when analyzing firms’ governance decisions will 
therefore help researchers to better predict what governance 
forms firms use in specific situations and why. 
2.1. Transaction cost economics
Differently from neoclassical economic conceptualizations, 
that considers pricing mechanism and firm solely as a production 
function, transaction cost economics (TCE) describes the firm 
also as an efficiency-inducing administrative instrument that 
takes into account the costs for negotiation efforts, contract 
design and coordination (Williamson, 1975). The notion of 
these costs was introduced by Coase (1937, 1960) and further 
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developed by Williamson (1979, 1985, 1991a) under the label 
of transaction costs. The transaction costs include ex-ante costs 
for negotiation efforts, contracts design, and safeguarding 
agreements, and ex-post costs for aligning and adapting the 
contract (Williamson, 1985).
The choice of institutional arrangement is seen as a central 
means through which management influences, monitors and 
enforces contractual performance (Williamson, 1975). It is 
related to firm’s intentions to economize on transaction costs. 
The presence of these costs explains which transactions are 
undertaken through the market and which are internalized within 
the firm (Coase, 1937). Economic agents align transaction with 
institutional arrangement to affect outcomes; therefore, the costs 
of one mode of governance are always examined in relation to 
alternative feasible modes (Williamson, 1996). Transaction costs 
arise from human behavioral assumptions that are: bounded 
rationality and opportunism. Bounded rationality is defined 
as behavior where economic agents attempt to optimize, but 
lack the cognitive capabilities to do so. In other words, it is 
the inability of economic actors to anticipate properly the 
consequences of their actions as well as the contingencies 
(Simon, 1957). Opportunism refers to the assumption that 
economic actors are self-interested in a calculative and devious 
manner – they comply with rules and regulations only when the 
cost of compliance is lower than the costs of non-compliance 
and they try to hide non-compliance (Williamson, 1985). 
Different institutional arrangements depend on transaction 
attributes, which are part of TCE and they are related to various 
dimensions of the transaction, especially asset specificity and 
uncertainty. According to Williamson (1979, 1985, 1991a, 1996, 
2005), these dimensions affect a firm’s governance decision that 
is based on a choice between competing alternative forms: 
market, hybrid, and hierarchy. In the original TCE framework, 
as developed by Williamson (1985), three main attributes of the 
transaction were distinguished: asset specificity, uncertainty and 
frequency. However, ` frequency` is not considered in our study, 
since its effect on firms’ governance decisions is ambiguous and 
not well understood (Geyskens, Steenkamp & Kumar, 2006; 
Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997).
Asset specificity refers to the degree by which the 
investments a party makes to support the transaction, ties it to the 
other party to the transaction. Williamson (1985) defines asset 
specific investment as “durable investment that are undertaken 
in support of particular transactions, the opportunity cost of 
which investment is much lower in best alternative uses or by 
alternative uses should the original transaction be prematurely 
terminated”. In other words, a specialized investment cannot 
be used in another transaction without a loss in value. The 
difference in value of the assets within and out of the specific 
relation is called the quasi-rent (Alchian, 1984). Hence, insofar 
as asset specificity is present, ex-post bargaining or hold-up risk 
increases and transaction costs rise (Klein, Crawford & Alchian, 
1978). In order to reduce the hold-up risk in the transaction that 
involves specialized investment, the transaction parties have 
strong incentives to rely less on spontaneous, market-based 
governance forms and more on hands-on governance forms 
(Williamson, 1991b). This can take the form of neoclassical 
contracts (i.e., arbitrator mediated arrangements) for transactions 
involving mixed-use investments (i.e., for transactions involving 
medium levels of asset specificity), or unified, hierarchical 
governance (vertical integration) for transactions involving 
idiosyncratic investments (i.e., for transactions involving highly 
specific investments) (Williamson, 1991a; see also Williamson, 
1975, 1979, 1985; Klein et al., 1978).
Uncertainty refers to unanticipated changes in the larger 
industry-context and institutional environment in which 
transactions are embedded. Given actors’ bounded rationality, 
they cannot (fully) anticipate these changes when entering 
into a transaction. As a result, actors will not be able to write 
contracts, which take into account all future states of the world; 
i.e., contracts are incomplete. Uncertainty makes transactions 
more unstable involving specific investments (more prone to 
maladaptation and hold-up problems) and more likely to be 
internalized even when the investments are only of a mixed-use 
nature (see Williamson, 1991a). 
2.2. Resource based view
The Resource-based view (RBV) is largely based on the 
work of Wenerfelt (1984), Rumelt (1984), Barney (1991), 
Peteraf (1993) and Conner (1991). RBV has been developed 
with a specific focus on how firms manage resources or 
knowledge and the complex combination between different 
sets of resources. According to RBV theory, resources that are 
common to many companies or which are easily available in 
the market cannot provide a sustainable competitive advantage. 
Only strategic resources (e.g., assets, skills, knowledge) that 
satisfy the conditions of being valuable rare, inimitable and non-
substitutable can generate such an advantage (Barney, 1991).
Barney (1991) distinguishes three main categories of 
resources: physical resources such as plant and equipment, 
human resources, such as technical specialists and teams, but 
also company executives, and organizational resources, formed 
by the norms and routines that coordinate the physical and 
human resources of the company. Hierarchical governance 
can help to develop and transfer tacit resources or knowledge, 
including shared norms and routines. Barney (1991) considers 
the dynamics of the process performance among the resources 
and their effects on the organization. Therefore, the strategic 
value of the resource is not only a result of the resource itself, 
nor for their connection with each other, but coming from the 
inter-relationships that exist between the whole set of resources 
controlled by the organization.
From this perspective, the essence of the firm is its ability to 
create, transfer, assemble, integrate and exploit these resources. 
Considering that these resources are used differently in each 
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organization, according to the perceptions of managers, then 
the firms are heterogenic and, consequently, there is different 
profitability among them. This conception of heterogeneity 
comes from the assumption that admits the nature of competition 
determined by establishing barriers to imitation and constant 
innovations. In RBV, not all features and capabilities have elastic 
supply, even for that, to be developed; some of them require a 
long period of time. This inelasticity of supply implies that firms 
possessing valuable resources can gain sustainable competitive 
advantage (Peteraf, 1993). In this sense, the deduction is that 
the main sources differences in profitability between firms arise 
from rents in Ricardian sense (return higher than the opportunity 
cost). In other words, it is assumed that economic rents for 
efficient firms derive from scarce sources and are made possible 
by the imperfections of market factors. Imperfections arise from 
managerial ability, the unique language used inside the firm and 
its specific organizational culture. They also arise from physical 
assets and innovations protected by patents or organizational 
competence, and even intangible assets such as consumer 
confidence, brand image and reputational capital. Barney and 
Arikan (2001) argue that these factors of production are perfectly 
inelastic, since the quantities offered are fixed (they are unique) 
and do not respond to changes in prices. From this perspective, 
what makes it a valuable resource is the peculiar way in which 
it is used by the firm (Teece and Pisano, 1994). However, there 
are authors that expand the notion of resources, assuming that 
its value, at least in part, depends on environmental conditions 
(Barney, 2001; Foss & Foss, 2005).
Foss and Foss (2005) argue in their study that also the 
property rights aspects of resources should be considered, 
especially the social environment should also be seen as a source 
of resource value, not only as a restrictive factor. The way how 
property rights are restricted under law, agreements or norms, 
influences the value that an owner of any resource can create 
and how much can be appropriated from that resource (Foss & 
Foss, 2005). For Kim and Mahoney (2007), if the property rights 
of the resource with the potential for value creation are not fully 
guaranteed in a business context in which multiple partners are 
involved, value creation cannot happen (see also Barney and 
Hansen, 1994; Kim and Mahoney, 2002). Similar difficulties 
may arise within firms, where multiple agents that provide inputs 
are producing economic value jointly (teamwork) (Alchian & 
Demsetz, 1972; Holmstrom, 1982). Kim and Mahoney (2007) 
argue that historical examples show that in some sectors the 
potential economic value creation (and rents) does not guarantee 
the effective creation of economic value. 
2.3. Property rights
Besides TCE, also Property Rights theory attempts to 
understand firm boundaries and their choice of institutional 
arrangement. Demsetz (1967) discussed property rights, using 
the neoclassical perspective to understand how property rights 
for specific transactions arise. According to Demsetz, property 
rights arise with the internalization of beneficial and harmful 
effects (externalities), when the gains of internalization become 
larger than the cost of internalization. Demsetz (1967) argues 
that property rights are exchanged in a transaction. Then, the 
value of the rights determines the value of the exchange. The 
problem that results from untradeable property rights is known 
as the common-resource problem, public-goods problem, free-
rider problem, and the tragedy of the commons (Milgrom & 
Roberts, 1992). According to Milgrom and Roberts (1992), 
“…when many people have the right to use a single shared 
resource, there is an incentive for the resource be overused…” 
(p. 294).  Considering the asset investment, if the residual 
returns of it are widely shared, no one has a sufficient interest 
to bear the cost of maintaining and increasing the value. For 
economic analysis, the “owning an asset” interpretation means 
that the residual rights of control, which is the right to make 
any decisions concerning the asset’s use that are not explicitly 
controlled by law or assigned by another contract. If ownership 
means having residual control, then its importance must derive 
from the difficulty of writing contracts that specify all the 
control rights. Thus, concentrating the ownership rights might 
be the efficient way; consequently, the hierarchy form prevails. 
Although TCE and property rights have been developed 
along different lines, both of them focus on the role of 
ownership as a way to avoid hold-up problems (Araujo, Dubois 
&  Gadde, 2003). Then, the emergence of the firm becomes 
a response to hold-up problems combined with the intrinsic 
opportunistic nature of human actors and the specialized assets 
required for efficient production. 
A perspective on property rights has been developed by 
Barzel (1982, 2001, 2002), who made significant contribution 
to Measurement Cost Theory. In Measurement Cost Theory, 
transactions are decomposed into various dimensions. Each 
transaction dimension represents a property right exchange 
and can be identified by a measurement cost. This cost brings a 
specific value to agents involved in the transaction. According 
to Zylbersztajn (2005), the specific value in the transaction 
can be dispersed if the property rights are not well defined, 
which can be difficult to measure, hence it can become difficult 
to contract specific attribute of transaction. Barzel (1997) 
considers the concept of property rights closely related to that 
of transaction costs. Transaction costs are defined by Barzel 
(1997) as “the costs associated with the transfer, capture, and 
protection of rights” (p.2). Barzel (2002) argues that the easier it 
is to measure and verify contract stipulations, the more readily 
the contract can be enforced. In other words, if the property 
rights can be well defined, the transaction will be performed by 
means of a formal contract. Insofar as it is difficult to measure 
the attributes, the transactions will be performed by agreements 
and extrajudicial mechanisms to protect property rights. If the 
measurement cost decrease, the agents will rely on contracts 
more than on vertical integration. 
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According to Zylbersztajn (2005), although both transaction 
cost economics and measurement cost theory share similarities, 
they differ in internal logic, explicit assumptions, and key 
measurable variables, which has methodological implications. 
Therefore, the difference between the transaction cost and the 
measurement cost theories deals with the empirical evidence 
of each theory to offer explanatory motives and testable 
hypotheses to determine alternative institutional arrangements. 
Based on Barzel (1997, 2002), the property rights structure 
is based on formal institutions, related to legal rights and the 
use of contracts; and the property rights defined by informal 
norms related to economic rights that prevail in the agreements. 
According to Zylbersztajn (2010), there are always aspects of 
property rights, which are unprotected; therefore, part of the 
value is subject to capture. It can be difficult to measure the 
transaction attributes and the contract might therefore not be 
executed.
The transaction is the principal unit of analysis, whenever 
the property rights are negotiated. Transactions occur within the 
institutional environment that impact the process of the property 
rights exchange. As it is the case with transaction cost theory, 
property rights theory assumes that the contracts are incomplete. 
With regard to residual control, the notion of residual returns that 
Milgrom and Roberts (1992) take into account is closely linked 
to contractual incompleteness. If contracts are complete, the 
division of the wealth in each eventuality could be ‘contracted 
on’, and there would be no economic returns that could be 
considered as ‘residual’. These two aspects of ownership – 
residual control and residual return – provide incentives for the 
owner to maintain and increase an asset’s value. The clearance 
and enforceable property rights that cannot be transferred easily 
or the information asymmetry denote the inefficiency in the 
transaction under market or contractual relation. If property 
rights are neither tradable nor secure, then owners will not invest 
great amounts in assets that they may lose with no compensation, 
or they may protect the specific assets under their own control 
without sharing or transacting. Then, the ownership rights 
should be structured with a concern to minimize the distortion 
in investment decision caused by the hold-up problem.
2.4. Possibilities for linking the theories
The Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) perspective has 
dominated the studies of make-or-buy decisions, providing 
ample evidence that transactions characterized by high levels 
of asset specificity tend to be internalized (Williamson, 1975, 
1985, Klein et al., 1978).  Much progress has been made in the 
analysis of vertical integration issues to understand what drives 
the governance decisions, such as transaction characteristics 
used by TCE. However, as observed Jacobides and Winter 
(2005) other stream of studies concerning strategy has come 
to discuss the boundary of firm: resource and capability-based 
view. This approach emphasizes the importance of resources in 
guiding firm action, and the management of a firm’s resource 
and capability portfolio as the central concern of strategy 
(Jacobides & Winter, 2005). 
In terms of competence perspective, Williamson (1999) 
argues that it gives greater prominence to organization 
theory since it “entails coordination and learning, is based on 
skill, assets, and routines, and is judged in comparison with 
rivals” (p.1094). Both governance and competence share a 
lot of ground and they are needed in complementary ways 
to understand complex phenomena of the boundary of firm, 
although there are differences between them (Williamson, 
1999). Then, assessing the resources bases of firms is necessary 
to understand choices of scope. 
Jacobides and Winter (2005) work on the theoretical 
framework that explains how capabilities co-evolve with 
transaction costs in order to better understand the firms’ 
governance structure choices. The authors focus on firm 
capabilities because, as they argue, in order to understand the 
decision to vertical integrate (or not), it is necessary to take into 
account the mechanisms by which transactional and capability 
conditions determine the choice of vertical integration. The 
capabilities are observed as well in the studies made by Bigelow 
and Argyres (2008). The production experiences obtained by 
firms, as well as the nature of firms’ pre-entry history, affect 
their boundaries decisions. From this perspective, firms with 
longer experience are more likely to integrate vertically (since 
they have more experience in doing so). Argyres and Zenger 
(2012) discuss the importance of the transaction cost and 
capabilities perspectives in studying firms’ boundary decisions, 
considering that these perspectives are interlaced in a particular 
dynamic way. According to these authors (Argyres & Zenger, 
2012), “if a firm possesses a comparatively superior capability 
because of its unique complementarity with the firm’s other 
assets, then ownership of this capability may both explain its 
historical formation and be essential to protecting the rents it 
generates” (p.11) Resource based view and transaction cost 
perspectives present complementarity logics as to drivers of 
firm boundaries (Augusto, Souza & Cario, 2013). 
The resources are related to the capabilities to create and 
retain value.  Both TCE and resource-based view (RBV) logics 
motivate integration in order to protect the value created from 
external appropriation. More generally, in order to minimize 
the transaction costs associated with generating and managing 
the assets. The protection of value is related to property rights 
and transaction costs as well (Barzel, 1997; Araujo et al., 2003). 
In the property rights approach, the firm is regarded as a set of 
assets under common ownership and control is equated with 
ownership. For Araujo et al. (2003), this view is only able to 
provide an answer to where the boundaries of the firm should 
lie, when those boundaries are related to the decision about 
physical asset ownership. These authors include the capabilities 
perspective to discuss the boundaries of firm. According to 
them, vertical integration leads to the development of in-house 
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Table 1
Comparative Characteristics of the Three Theories
Unit of analysis Transaction/ contract Resources Individual property rights  (Foss & Foss, 2005)
Focal dimension Characteristic of transaction Possession of resources Ensure the property rights
Risk and 
uncertainty
TCE emphasizes the downside associated 
with risk or uncertainty in describing how 
uncertainty in the presence of specific 
investment may lead to misappropriation or 
hold-up problems (Williamson, 1985).
The expected results due to 
the uncertainty depend on 
the judgment of the agents 
and their learning.
Generates opportunism of parties: 
moral hazard, adverse selection 
and free rider problem requires 
structures to protect the property 
rights 
Focal cost 
concern
Economizing on transaction costs by 
reducing maladaptation or hold-up 
problems, resulting from making specific 
investments to the extent that the marginal 
costs of reducing the problem are equal the 
opportunity costs of continued exposure to 
the problem.
Maximizing the return on 
the firm’s assets based on 
acquiring unique assets, 
which either has upside 
potential, or which potential 
can better realized inside the 
acquiring firm.
Maximizing the marginal return on 
non-contractible investments. 
 The property rights arise with the 
internalization of beneficial and 
harmful effects (externalities), 
when the gains of internalization 
become larger than the cost of 
internalization (Demsetz, 1967)
Sources of 
market friction
Degree of asset specificity, uncertainty and 
performance ambiguity.
Difficult to replicate 
resources
Information asymmetry
Predicted 
response to 
market friction
- Increase in degree of asset specificity 
increases likelihood of vertical integration.
- Increase in uncertainty reduces threshold 
for vertical integration when asset 
specificity is present.
- Increase in performance measurement 
ambiguity increases likelihood of vertical 
integration.
- Vertically integrate to 
acquire unique resources
- To the extent that 
unique resources are also 
idiosyncratic, TCE and 
RBV will predict that firms 
vertically integrate under the 
same conditions.
- Increase in asset specificity only 
increases likelihood of vertical 
integration if the marginal returns 
on non-contractible returns are 
affected – (See Whinston 2003).
Motivation for 
response
Integration increases administrative control 
(which reduces ability for parties to act 
opportunistic) and reduces incentives 
for (strong-forms) opportunism (as hard-
powered incentives are replaced by low-
powered incentives). (Williamson, 1991a)
Intangible knowledge can be 
better transferred inside the 
firm (integration).
Boundaries are related to the 
decision about physical asset 
ownership 
Source: Adapted from “Property rights theory, transaction costs theory, and agency theory: An organizational economics approach to strategic management” from Kim and 
Mahoney (2005), Managerial and Decision Economics, 26: 223-242.; and “Reassessing the Fundamentals and Beyond: Ronald Coase, the Transaction Cost and Resource-
based Theories of the Firm, and the Institutional Structure of Production” by Madhok (2002), Strategic Management Journal, 23: 535-550.
capabilities. Then, the capability assessments are firm specific 
and are internally governed because of capability in an asset 
is firm specific (Argyles & Zenger, 2012). 
2.5. Theoretical predictions
According to the theories used to analyze some wineries 
in Brazil to understand the reasons for hierarchy form, the 
theoretical predictions are described as following: 
Transaction Cost Economics: As the level of asset 
specificity increases in the grape-growers-winery transaction, 
the likelihood that hierarchical forms are used to govern the 
transaction increases;
Property rights: As the level information asymmetry 
between the grape-grower and winery increases, the likelihood 
that hierarchical forms are used to govern the transaction 
increases;
Resource Based View: As the need to learn about (changes 
in) grape production methods increases and the required 
knowledge becomes more tacit, the likelihood that hierarchical 
forms are used to govern the transaction increases.
3. METHODOLOGY
The research design is a multiple case study, chosen to 
make comparison between different real cases, thus providing 
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more consistent insights than a single case study. The purpose 
of the case study method is theoretical generalization rather 
than statistical generalization (Yin, 1989; De Vaus, 2001). 
The objective of this study is to understand the production and 
transaction characteristics that lead to the choice governance 
form in organizations in the process of transforming grapes into 
wine. Three wineries were selected in order to help understand 
the multiple factors that influence their governance decisions. 
Data was gathered by means of personal interviews with 
owners and senior executives of the wineries. A semi-structured 
research instrument was used. Additionally, secondary data was 
collected about the Brazilian wine sector, using sources such as 
IBRAVIN – Instituto Brasileiro do Vinho. The three wineries 
are located in Vale dos Vinhedos and Vale do Rio São Francisco: 
Don Laurindo is located in Vale dos Vinhedos (RS); Miolo is 
in Vale dos Vinhedos and in Vale do Rio São Francisco; and 
ViniBrasil is in Vale do Rio São Francisco (Figure 1).
4. THE CASE OF WINE PRODUCERS IN BRASIL
By the end of 1980s, medium and large companies, and 
cooperatives dominated the wine industry. The grape growers 
supplied the wineries and only produced the grapes for the 
market (Schmidt, 2012). In terms of technology, improvement 
occurred in the industrial field, but the same did not happen 
in the viticulture sector. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the 
large wineries went through economic and financial crises, 
and were affected by the opening of the market in the 1990s 
to foreign companies, which provided an environment for the 
increase of wine imported from 13% in 1992 to 32% in 1994 
(Mello, 1995). Moreover, the Mercosul and the high level of 
tax motivated the farmers to new decisions and strategies. Thus 
dozens of small wineries arose in rural area. These wineries 
were characterized by the industrialization of wine production, 
which resulted in the improvement of the Brazilian fine wines 
quality (Falcade, 2004). 
The wine in Brazil is regulated since 1988 with the Law 
n. 7678 and amended with the Law 10970 in 2004, which 
provides regulation for production, distribution and marketing 
of wine and grapes. 
The focus of this work is one the analysis of the upstream 
part of the supply chain of wine – the grape-grower and winery 
transaction. A supply chain is a set of commercial and financial 
relations which establish, among all the stages of processing 
Figure 1: Location of the Companies Analyzed in the Case Studies
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a stream of exchange, located upstream and downstream, 
between suppliers and customers (Batalha, 2007).
Figure 2, in general, is the systematization of the supply 
chain of the grape and / or wine, due to their inter-relationships. 
According to Garcia Filho (1999) regarding the establishment 
of the agricultural production system, it can be defined as a 
combination (in time and space) of resources available for 
obtaining the crops and animals. A production process is a 
system of actions that are interrelated dynamically and are 
geared towards the transformation of certain elements. Thus, 
the input elements, the grapes, become output elements, the 
wine, following a process of value added. 
The production itself refers to the practice of grape 
cultivation, corresponding to the stage of planting and 
harvesting (Pereira & Gameiro, 2008). Grape production in the 
South of Brazil, the largest producer of grapes in the country, 
is almost entirely focused on the manufacture of wines. Called 
the operation vintage harvest grape for wine making, which 
depends on several factors, the most important being the health 
and ripeness of the grapes, which defines the type of wine to 
be produced (Santos, Machado, Dias, Novai & Ferreira, 2007).
4.1. Cases studies analysis
4.1.1. Miolo Wine Group
Although the Miolo winery was founded in 1989 by three 
brothers of Miolo’s family, the company existed prior to 
that date, when the Miolo’s family arrived in Brazil in 1897 
(Dolabella & Bittencourt, 2012). Before the foundation of the 
company they were only grape growers to supply wineries 
around their farm. The decision to start the production of wine 
took place because of the crisis in the Brazilian wine industry 
when the grapes started to have the same value as the American 
and hybrid grapes (Dolabella, 2006). Since 1995, sales began 
to grow a lot, which led the company to be the leader in the 
fine wine national market (P.Miolo, personal communication, 
March 11, 2013).
Miolo, which began producing wines from their own grapes 
and bottling them, also bought grapes from other 80 producers, 
called outgrowers, in the Vale dos Vinhedos (Dolabella, 2006). 
Although there is no formal contract between the Miolo and 
their outgrowers, the company supplied them with seeds and 
discounted the value of these over time and monitored the 
production. In the year of 2000, Miolo acquired 81 acres of 
land in the city of Bagé (500 km from Bento Gonçalves). The 
production in the lands of Bage enabled the company to reduce 
the number of outgrowers to 20, and the selection of these 
outgrowers was according to the quality, volume and adoption 
of planting grape in trellises. In 2006, the Miolo changed its 
name to Miolo Wine Group, and acquired the winery Ouro 
Verde in Petrolina, Vale do Rio São Francisco, where it 
produces sparkling wine named Terra Nova. Grapes out of its 
own production are used sporadically for the production of 
sparkling base. In case of purchasing grapes in the market, this 
is due to the opportunity offered by the market, when the grapes 
Figure 2: Wine Supply Chain
Source: Embrapa (2007).
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are not exported, have good quality and can be purchased at a 
price below its own production cost, according to Miolo (2013).
A TCE perspective: motives for vertical integration
According to the respondent of our interview, although 
Miolo buys the grapes from these known 20 outgrowers, if 
they decide no longer work with the Miolo, it would not be a 
big concern to the company, because the quantity purchased of 
them is small, around 500 tons/year, which represents 4% of 
the total. Because of the asset specificity (Williamson, 1991a), 
such as temporal specificity, locational specificity, brand name 
capital, efficiency of production presented in the hierarchy 
arrangement justifies the preference of Miolo. The company 
maintains relationships with 20 selected outgrowers at that time 
because they were able to adapt to Miolo’s requirements. Miolo 
offers full support for the 20 outgrowers supplying the seeds 
and technical assistance throughout the production process in 
order to obtain grapes with the required quality. There is a social 
aspect that Miolo and these outgrowers built a trust relation, 
what allow a relation without a written contract. In terms of 
TCE, as the reputation has been built between the parties, there 
is no need for all the specifications in the contract or even a 
contract, which decreases the ink costs. 
A RBV perspective: ability to vertically integrate
Although Miolo purchases grapes from its 20 outgrowers, 
the wine branded Lote 43 is produced only from the grapes of 
its own production. This wine is named Lote 43 because it was 
the land that the Miolo’s family received when they arrived 
in the Vale dos Vinhedos. Considering the RBV, the value is 
created on the production of the wine Lote 43 since it is direct 
related to the grapes produced in the Lote 43 and cannot be 
imitable. This specific wine for Miolo generates a competitive 
advantage for Miolo, using Barney’s study (1991). Moreover, 
the complex process of producing wine is related to the 
knowledge and skills of Miolo that is intangible assets, which 
are difficult to be transferred or traded. Then, the centralized 
control ownership into an integrated firm is justified thorough 
RBV theory, besides the TCE related to the asset specificity.
A property rights theory perspective: measurement problems 
are not an issue
In terms of Property Rights Theory, if the property rights 
were well defined, they could be easily traded. As Miolo has 
the residual control, then it is difficult to write the contract 
specifying all the control rights prevailing the informal 
contracts with its 20 outgrowers. The government (National 
Supply Company - CONAB) establishes the price of each 
grape variety. The process to obtain the quality required for the 
production of a particular type of wine depends on the sugar 
and acidity contained in the grape that can be evaluated in the 
laboratory, beyond the time of harvest. However, the monitoring 
of grape production is complex and not easily to be transferred. 
As Miolo prioritizes quality of grapes, it offers financial 
incentives to its 20 outgrowers. The company evaluates the 
characteristics of the grapes received and classifies them as 
following: 2A, 1A, 1B, 1C. According to the classification, 
Miolo pays a bonus on the value of the CONAB price. This 
bonus varies as following: 2A – plus 100% of the value of 
CONAB; 1A – plus 70% of the value of CONAB; 1B – plus 
30% of the value of CONAB; 1C – do not buy. In this case, 
the attributes of transaction are defined and the measurement 
costs decreases. Then, Miolo can perform contracts with its 20 
outgrowers than vertical integration instead, analyzed according 
to Barzel’s studies (1982, 2001, 2002).
A combined perspective 
Analyzing Miolo’s strategy from a governance and 
competence perspective, the company tends to vertical 
integration since competence implies coordination and learning 
and it is based on skill, assets, and routines. Miolo has acquired 
knowledge for wine production process since the experience in 
the wine field is before the foundation of the company, when 
Miolo’s family only cultivated grapes. This experience makes 
the Miolo Wine Group more likely to integrate vertically the 
grape production for its wine because of resource/capability 
view and TCE, based on Bigelow and Argyres (2008). Although 
Miolo brought grapes from 80 outgrowers, the winery decided 
to invest in its own land to increase its grape production. It has 
continued to purchase grapes from only 20 outgrowers, which 
is not very significant considering the size of the company. The 
decision to become more vertically integrated, according to its 
historical context, is because Miolo has superior productive 
capabilities in comparison with its outgrowers, based on 
Jacobides and Winter (2005). Moreover, based on Jacobides 
and Winter (2005), Miolo’s knowledge accumulation lead 
gains from its specialization in wine production process and it 
might imply the success in its products trade. Miolo owns the 
residual rights of control to produce its wine according to its 
requirement. These residual rights are difficult to be expressed 
into a contract (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992); then Miolo is more 
likely vertically integrated. 
4.1.2. Don Laurindo Winery
Don Laurindo is a small family company, producing both 
grapes and wine. It has only nine employees, all of which are 
members of the Brandelli family that founded the company. 
The company is located within the main wine production region 
of Rio Grande do Sul, Vale dos Vinhedos, close to the cities of 
Bento Gonçalves and Garibaldi. There, Don Laurindo owns 15 
hectares of vineyards from which it produces 120.000 bottles of 
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wine each year. For its wine production, the company uses only 
grapes from its own vineyards. The company markets its wines 
almost exclusively within Brazil; just 2% of its production is 
exported(1). 
The company’s history goes back to the late 19th century, 
when the current owners’ great grandfather, Marcelino 
Brandelli, emigrated from Italy to Brazil. This was a period in 
which Rio Grande do Sul attracted many immigrants from Italy. 
Brazil’s federal government incentivized the immigrants to 
come to the state by offering them favorable terms to purchase 
land. The Italians were mainly offered land within the Serra 
Gaúcha region, where Vale dos Vinhedos is located. When Mr. 
Brandelli arrived there in the 1880s, he relied on substance 
farming to support him-self. He also started to grow vineyards 
in order to make wine for family consumption.  
Mr. Brandelli’s offspring purchased additional land for 
commercial grape production, while continuing the patriarch’s 
tradition of making wine for friends and family. This modus 
operandi, where the Brandelli family commercialized its grapes 
but not its wines, continued until the beginning of the 1990s. 
During the systemic crisis that plagued Brazilian`s wine industry 
in this period, the family`s main customer stopped procuring 
grapes while earlier several of its smaller customers had already 
gone bankrupt. Subsequently, the family started its own winery 
– Vinhos Don Laurindo LTDA. As of today, the company 
markets all of its grape production to its own internal winery. 
The winery uses the grapes to produce 90.000 liters of wine each 
year. Ninety percent of this is red wine, while the remaining 10 
percent is white wine (including sparkling wine). A couple of 
its wines are certified as “Origin Controlled Denomination”. 
(A.Brandelli, personal communication, March 11, 2013).
A TCE perspective: motives for vertical integration
The transaction attributes demand uncertainty and temporal 
asset specificity help to explain why the company integrated 
into wine production. The main purpose of the company in 
taking this step was to guarantee its survival during adverse 
market conditions. This decision was more or less forced on the 
company because of these two TCE factors; integration helped 
the company to economize on transaction costs resulting from 
uncertainty and temporal asset specificity.
Demand uncertainty was the main factor in the company 
decision. Market conditions can certainly be characterized as 
uncertain when Don Laurindo integrated into wine production. 
As it is explained above, the Brazilian wine industry was 
affected by a crisis in the beginning of the 1990s. This perhaps 
especially affected Don Laurindo, as its main customer stopped 
procuring its grapes. Thus, it not only faced the prospect of low 
grape-prices and uncertainty about future demand, it had also 
lost its main marketing channel. To understand the company 
decision to make its own wine, note that the company would 
have been less affected by demand uncertainty as an integrated 
grape grower-winery operation than as an independent grape 
grower. Grapes have to be harvested within a certain period 
and cannot be stored, unlike wine. Therefore, an integrated 
grape grower-winery has more control over the time at which it 
markets its (wine) output as it can hold inventory when demand 
is low(2). As an independent grape grower, Don Laurindo was 
not able to hold inventory. Integrated helped the company to 
reduce its exposure to uncertainty. 
While the above-mentioned market conditions were an 
obvious factor in Don Laurindo’s decision to start marketing its 
own wines, the role of asset specificity was subtler. At present, 
grape grower-winery relations in the Vale dos Vinhedos region do 
not seem to be characterized by asset specificity related concerns. 
There are multiple wineries within the region and grape growers 
can easily switch from one winery to another as most wineries 
use similar types of grape-inputs. However, during the crisis, 
temporal specificity (e.g., see Williamson, 1991a) could have 
affected grape grower-winery transactions. Especially, wineries 
might have used the above-mentioned temporal constraints 
that affect grape production to opportunistically renegotiate 
transaction terms. They would certainly be in position to do this; 
grape growers would have had fewer alternatives to market their 
grapes than during normal market conditions, as several wineries 
faced difficulties. Forward integration into wine production 
reduces a grape-grower’s exposure to such temporal related 
opportunism. While retailers may also attempt to renegotiate 
transaction terms, temporal constraints play a more limited role 
as the winery can store its output. Vertical integrated therefore 
also helped to reduce the company`s exposure to demand risk 
of opportunism, in line with TCE`s predictions. 
A RBV perspective: ability to vertically integrate
The crisis not only had a downside. With various wineries 
now experiencing difficulties, the wine market was also less 
crowded than before. The company saw this as an opportunity 
to leverage its human resources and start marketing its own 
wines, using its high quality grapes and knowledge about wine-
production to make exclusive wines. The company was able to 
forward integrate because the family honed the tacit knowledge 
or skill of making high quality wine over various generations. 
Thus, while demand uncertainty forced the company to take 
action, the reason it was able to start producing its wine was 
that the company already possessed the human resources to do 
it. In other words, while TCE factors helps us to understand 
the company`s motive to vertically integrate, RBV helps us to 
understand why the company was in position to do this. 
RBV helps to explain not only why the company was able 
to integrate into wine production, but also why the company 
is still organized in this manner. The Brandelli family has 
a long tradition in the production of grapes (and wine) and 
this cannot be easily replicated in the market. According to 
the management of Don Laurindo, it is not difficult to find 
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high-quality grape producers in Vale dos Vinhedos, as also 
external grape growers possess the required human and physical 
resources to produce high quality grapes. However, they lack 
the required tacit knowledge about how producing the grapes 
with the specific characteristics Don Laurindo requires for its 
particular wines. This knowledge, embedded deeply within 
the norms and routines of the organization, cannot be easily 
codified and communicated to external grape growers.
A property rights theory perspective: measurement problems 
are not an issue
PRT appears, at first, less relevant than the other two 
theories for explaining the firms choice of governance form. For 
example, according to the management of Don Laurindo, it is 
not difficult to measure grape quality (e.g., laboratory analysis 
can reveal the acid levels of the grapes). Therefore, no material 
information asymmetries exist between grape producers and 
wine producers about the quality of the grapes. If the company 
did use external suppliers, shirking or quality cheating by those 
suppliers would not be a problem; the suppliers could be paid 
based on the quality of the delivered grapes. For example, Don 
Laurindo could give the suppliers bonuses if the grapes meet 
or exceed its requirements (as Miolo does). 
However, issues with regard to residual control rights 
over the production process do affect the company choice 
of procurement form. While many aspects of the production 
process could be specified in advance in contracts with external 
grape growers (e.g., type of grapes to use, type of technology), 
such contracts would limit the company ability and rights to 
make adjustments to the process when it so desires. Internal 
procurement gives the company full control over how the 
production process is organized and it can make adjustments 
to that process whenever it wants. 
A combined perspective
The Don Laurindo case showed that, as Williamson (1999) 
observed, the TCE and RBV perspectives are complementary. 
While a TCE perspective help to explain why Don Laurindo 
vertically integrated into wine-production, a RBV perspective 
explains why the company was in a position to do so. 
Furthermore, both perspectives combine well with the Property-
Rights (PR) perspective in this case. PR helps to explain why 
Don Laurindo remains fully vertically integrated; i.e., it sheds 
light on why the winery-part of the company does not procure 
grapes (also) from external grape-grower. 
From a TCE perspective, high temporal asset specificity 
and demand uncertainty increased the company`s costs of 
transacting with external wineries. Vertical integration into 
wine-production reduced those costs. From a RBV perspective, 
the knowledge and experience Don Laurindo had acquired 
over various generations about wine-production over various 
generations meant that the company already had the required 
competences to make high-quality wines. Based on a study of 
Bigelow and Argyres (2008) that combines RBV with TCE, 
it is observed that the experience of Don Laurindo in wine 
production makes the company more likely to move from being 
a mere grape-producer to being also a wine producer. Because 
Don Laurindo is vertical integrated, this governance structure 
affects the knowledge development process and allows it to 
also develop and leverage its superior capabilities in wine-
making, according to Jacobides and Winter (2005). From a PR 
perspective, the company remains vertically integrated rather 
than, for example, spinning-of the grape-production part of its 
business, because of difficulties in fully specifying residual 
control rights over the grape-production process. Sourcing 
grapes from external grape-growers is furthermore not a 
desirable option for Don Laurindo because such grape-growers 
lack the tacit knowledge to produce the specific grapes that the 
companies require for the production of its fine wines. Therefore, 
Don Laurindo remains integrated also because of the superior 
capability of its internal-grape grower vis-à-vis external growers 
to make the grapes it needs (see also Argyres & Zenger, 2012). 
4.1.3. ViniBrasil (Global Wines/Dão Sul)
ViniBrasil was founded in June 2003, started by a top 
Portuguese wine company, Dão Sul. It is located in the Vale do 
Rio São Francisco, which in itself makes an interesting story 
as the vast majority of wineries producing fine wines in Brazil 
are located in the Vale dos Vinhedos - RS. ViniBrasil grows 
its grapes in a challenging environment (close to the equator) 
using innovative management practices such as controlled 
irrigation and year-round harvesting (Bell, Neves, Thomé e 
Castro & Shelman, 2010).
The company currently has a total production area of 
2000 hectares, with 200 hectares of grapes, as well as an 
experimental area for testing new varieties and combinations. 
The winery produces about 1 million liters of wine/year, with 
84 permanent employees (J.Santos, personal communication, 
March 14, 2013). 
The ViniBrasil positioned itself as a winery producing 
differentiated wine-products in Brazil. The price for the final 
consumer is equivalent to the price of fine wines in the market, 
and even below some of the wine products from Argentina and 
Chile (Bell et al, 2010) and its product portfolio consists of the 
following brands: Rio Sol, Paralelo 8 Tenants, Vinha Maria, 
Matuto and Adega do Vale. Paralelo 8 is the highest quality 
wine of ViniBrasil.
A TCE perspective: motives for vertical integration
Similar to Don Laurindo case, the transaction attributes 
demand uncertainty and temporal asset specificity. These 
characteristics help to explain the ViniBrasil decision to produce 
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the grapes in-house. ViniBrasil opted to have total control of 
production since its foundation. Then, the company produces its 
own grapes in order to acquire the characteristics required for its 
wine production. Santos (2013) observes the fact that having its 
own grape production, the company eliminates demand problems 
since it controls what will produce. Currently, the company is 
guaranteed with a stock production for a year of sales. 
Site specificity is one of the most important assets for 
ViniBrasil, because its wine is characterized as unique wine 
with qualities related to the location. The ViniBrasil invested 
in brands, highlighting specific characteristics of the region and 
its wines. For example, the Rio Sol is a brand that blends the 
idea of the São Francisco River with the sun, which explains 
the geographical location of the winery - the border of the São 
Francisco River, 8 degrees south latitude. The region at this 
latitude is the exception to produce commercial wines, as well 
as being one of the new frontiers wineries in the world. Also 
the slogan used by the company highlights this feature, “New 
Latitude, New Attitude” (p.12) according to Bell’s et al. study 
(2010), that means that produce wines overcoming technical 
paradigms, such as the use of irrigation in a semi-arid region.
A RBV perspective: ability to vertically integrate
ViniBrasil has invested in innovation, breeding of grapes, 
because the company believed that it would not be easy to 
find suppliers of grapes in the Vale do Rio São Francisco with 
the same characteristics as those produced by ViniBrasil. The 
expertise of the production process has been developed over the 
years since the region has a particular climate in comparison 
with other producing regions in Brazil.
The workers have few job options in Vale do Rio São 
Francisco what make favorable for ViniBrasil. The number of 
permanent employees increases in the company and some of 
them have been working in ViniBrasil since its foundation. This 
aspect is extremely important because the company has been 
developing its human resources over the years. It is understood 
that vertical integration enables the company to control the 
entire process and prevents it from being imitated. They have 
been investing for many years in grapes adapted to the Vale do 
Rio São Francisco, and they created an intangible asset that is 
difficult to be copied or even switched.
A property rights theory perspective: measurement problems 
are not an issue
ViniBrasil wants to ensure that all the investment it has 
made  over the years, such as in innovation, improvement of 
grape seeds adapted to the region, and irrigation, is secure. 
The company is interested in appropriating the value created. 
Thus, for the firm, vertical integration allows the company to 
create value and also to keep the value created. Furthermore, 
the winery has the residual control rights over the production 
process. Similar to Don Laurindo, ViniBrasil can make 
adjustments to its production process whenever it is necessary. 
Since there are no suppliers with the ViniBrasil requirements, 
they need to be developed and this process of development 
involves knowledge transfer and higher investments in 
irrigation. Moreover, ViniBrasil would need to monitor these 
suppliers. On the other hands, these suppliers could require 
part of the residual control rights. Sharing the knowledge with 
the suppliers, ViniBrasil could fail to appropriate the value 
generated through the brand related to its location.
A combined perspective 
ViniBrasil invested in capability improvement in the 
particular climate of Vale do Rio São Francisco. According to 
Jacobides and Winter (2005), the development of capabilities 
depends on how integrated a firm is.  ViniBrasil made specific 
investments and created superior capability to cultivate grapes 
for its wine in a Brazilian region that is radically different 
from other grape producing regions. Because of its superior 
capability, outside suppliers with comparable capability do 
not exist; therefore, ViniBrasil continues to be integrated 
(Argyres & Zenger, 2012). ViniBrasil possesses its own grape 
production process for providing specific grapes to its wine 
that developed a superior capability in comparison with outside 
grape producers. It is observed that capability resource view 
and TCE perspectives are complementary. Besides the resource/
capability resource based view, ViniBrasil has the residual 
control rights and does not want to share the knowledge to other 
suppliers what makes this winery for vertical integration choice.
5. FINAL REMARKS
In this paper we studied governance decisions in the 
Brazilian wine industry. Especially, we examined the types 
of governance forms three wineries used to procure their 
grapes. We analyzed the governance decisions through three 
different theoretical lenses: TCE, PRT, and RBV. We used 
the cases to illustrate that, in isolation, each of the theories 
yields insufficient insights into the motives and ability for 
firms to select and use hierarchical governance forms. Table 2 
summarizes the main results of the study.
The table shows how the different theoretical perspectives 
are complementary. While TCE and PRT are mainly useful for 
identifying the motives companies have to vertically integrate, 
RBV is more useful for identifying whether companies have 
capabilities to integrate or undertake a certain production 
activity (in this case wine-production). Studies that would 
have used only a single theoretical perspective to analyze 
these transactions would have given only a limited insight 
in the companies` governance decisions in each case. For 
example, a study that would analyze the Don Laurindo case 
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only from a TCE perspective would not be able to explain why 
the company remains vertically integrated. That is because 
the TCE factors that led the company to integrate into wine 
production (demand uncertainty and temporal asset specificity) 
are no longer present. Likewise, a RBV analysis of the case 
would not be able to explain why the company, if it had the 
capabilities to make fine wines, it did not integrate earlier into 
wine production; i.e., it would only be able to explain why the 
company was able to integrate, but not when it choose to do 
so. Furthermore, a PR analysis of the case would be able to 
explain why the company remains integrated, but not be able 
to explain why it integrated in the first place. This is because 
the difficulty the wine-part of the company had in specifying 
control rights of the grape-production process only arose after 
the company integrated into wine production. 
While some studies argue for integrating the different 
theoretical perspectives, we would not go so far. In our opinion, 
combining the various perspectives is a sufficient and a more 
productive way forward. In the former (integrating theoretical 
perspectives), a shared theoretical language would need to be 
developed (e.g., changing `asset specificity` for `idiosyncratic 
competences`) and possible inconsistencies in the different 
theoretical perspectives would need to be overcome (e.g., 
situations in which one perspective argues for integration and 
another perspective argues against). In the latter (combining 
theoretical perspectives), researchers simply attempt to study 
the subject of their analysis from various angles. Whenever the 
perspectives offer conflicting recommendations, the researcher 
opportunistically uses the perspective, which best help to 
explain the studied phenomenon. And, more importantly, the 
researcher attempts to leverage the best of each perspective; 
that is the researchers attempts to use the various perspectives 
to explain different aspects of the studied phenomenon (e.g., to 
use TCE for studying the motivation of a company to integrate, 
and to use RBV for studying its ability to integrate). Our study 
suggests that future research into this complex interaction 
among the three different theories is well warranted to explain 
the hierarchical governance form.
Table 2
Comparative Characteristics of the Three Theories Applied to the Wineries Cases
Miolo Don Laurindo ViniBrasil
TCE
- TCE helps to explain why the company 
integrated into wine production and 
purchased from small number of selected 
outgrowers: it reduced transaction costs 
resulting from demand uncertainty, 
temporal and locational asset specificity
- TCE helps to explain why the company 
vertically integrated into wine production: 
it reduced transaction costs resulting from 
demand uncertainty and temporal asset 
specificity.
- TCE helps to explain why 
the company is vertically 
integrated: it reduced 
transaction costs resulting 
from uncertainty and 
locational asset specificity
RBV
- RBV helps to explain why the company 
was able to vertically integrate: the 
company has longer experience 
producing grapes and wine with tacit 
knowledge acquired.
- RBV helps to explain why the company 
was able to vertically integrate: it already 
possessed the required competences to 
make fine wines. 
- RBV furthermore helps to explain why 
the company remained integrated: the tacit 
knowledge the company has about grape 
production is difficult to communicate to 
external growers.
- RBV helps to explain 
why the company was 
able to vertically integrate: 
it invested in innovation, 
breeding of grapes that are 
specific to a region with 
particular climate.
PR
- PR helps to explain why the company 
prefers to vertically integration: the 
control of residual rights of the grape 
and wine production. Moreover, because 
the difficult to trade the residual control, 
informal contracts with outgrowers prevail. 
- PR offers another perspective on why the 
company remains integrated: the control 
rights of the grape-production process 
are difficult to specify in a contract since 
the production requirements frequently 
change. 
- PR helps to explain why 
the company decided 
to vertically integrate: to 
ensure that all investment 
in innovation, grapes seeds 
adapted to the region.
(1) Its main export markets are Canada, the Czech 
Republic and Mexico. 
(2) Note that companies are not able to hold inventory 
if they face strong liquidity constraints (i.e., when 
they need to sell of inventory to generate cash). 
Differential liquidity constraints amongst industry 
participants may therefore explain why some of them 
were not able to withstand the crisis. N
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Understanding the hierarchy governance choice of some wineries in Brazil - case study of 3 
Brazilian wineries
This study aims to contribute towards understanding the multiple factors, which influence firm’s governance decisions. 
To identify some of these factors, three cases in the Brazilian wine industry were analyzed: Miolo located in Vale dos 
Vinhedos (South of Brazil) and in Vale do Rio São Francisco (Northeast of Brazil); Don Laurindo located in Vale dos 
Vinhedos; and ViniBrasil located in Vale do Rio São Francisco. For the most part, all three firms procure the grapes 
they use for their wine production in-house. Only Miolo purchases an insignificant amount of grapes outside of its 
production. By Brazilian standards, these regions have a long tradition of grape production and it is not difficult to 
purchase sufficient quantity of grapes to produce wine. However, the wineries are concerned also about the quality of 
the grapes they use and purchasing high-quality grapes might be critical issue. On the other hand, the quality of grapes 
is easily measured and the cost to buy in the market is cheaper than producing in-house. Furthermore, also the level 
of asset specificity present in the grape-grower–wine-producer transaction seems, by itself, insufficient to justify the 
use of hierarchical governance forms. Then, the aim of the article is to analyze the reasons why these wineries largely 
rely on hierarchy governance forms to procure their grape-inputs. What explains their use of hierarchy governance, 
given that both asset specificity and measurement problems appear to be relatively low?
Keywords: Brazilian wineries, hierarchy governance, transaction costs economics, resource based view, property  
 rights.
Análisis de la elección de las estructuras de gobierno en vinícolas brasileñas - estudios de caso 
en 3 bodegas
Este estudio tiene como objetivo contribuir a la comprensión de los múltiples factores que influyen en las decisiones 
de gobernanza de las empresas. Para identificar algunos de estos factores, se analizaron tres casos en la industria 
del vino brasileño: Miolo ubicada en Valle de los Viñedos (sur de Brasil) y en Vale do Rio São Francisco (nordeste 
de Brasil); Don Laurindo ubicada en Valle de los Viñedos, y ViniBrasil ubicada en Vale do Rio São Francisco. En 
su mayor parte, las tres empresas producen las uvas que utilizan para su producción de vino. Sólo Miolo compra 
una cantidad insignificante de las uvas fuera de su producción. Según los estándares brasileños, en estas regiones 
tiene una larga tradición de producción de uva, y no es difícil comprar suficiente cantidad de uvas para producir 
vino. Sin embargo, las bodegas están preocupadas también por la calidad de las uvas que se utilizan y la compra 
de uvas de alta calidad podrían ser tema crítico. Por otro lado, es fácil de medir la calidad de las uvas y el costo 
para comprar en el mercado es más barato que producir. Por otra parte, también el nivel de especificidad de los 
activos presentes en la transacción de productor de uva-bodeguero parece, por sí sola, insuficiente para justificar 
el uso de formas jerárquicas. Entonces, el objetivo del artículo es analizar las razones por las que estas bodegas 
dependen en gran medida de las formas jerárquicas para adquirir sus vendimiadores entradas. ¿Cómo se explica 
el uso de la gobernanza jerárquica, teniendo en cuenta que tanto los problemas de especificidad de activos y de 
medición parecen ser relativamente bajos? 
Palabras clave: bodegas brasileñas, gobernanza jerarquía, economía de los costos de transacción, visión basada en los  
  recursos, los derechos de propiedad. 
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